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Jill Stauffer and Bettina Bergo’s editorial endeavor to bring together a compilation of articles 
under the rubric of the famous Nietzschean verdict of the “death of God” is a valuable one in 
that it allows for a novel approach to this problem.  What strikes the reader as particularly 
interesting, however, is the decision on the part of the editors to reframe this problem in the 
form of a dialogue between two radically different thinkers:  Nietzsche, the iconoclast, the one 
who sets out to destroy the last vestiges of an already decadent Western morality for an 
affirmation of the self against all odds.  And Levinas, the thinker par excellence of ethics, ob-
sessed with the other and with the sacrifice of the self for the other.  The editors’ choice to 
bring together such radically different world-views will strike the Levinas lover or Nietz-
schean disciple as disconcerting.  Indeed, the deep differences between the two philosophers 
seem to exclude any form of reconciliation or dialogue. 
Yet, at the same time, one wonders if it is not precisely in the confrontation of the two 
that philosophical progress is rendered possible.  Indeed, this encounter between Levinas and 
Nietzsche has the potential for incredible fruitfulness and this is precisely because of their 
deep and irreconcilable differences.  For it is in the difficult dialogue between these differences 
that light can be shed on the limitations in each thinker and a way can be paved, albeit 
through repeated confrontation, to new horizons of thinking and new approaches to the issue 
at hand.   
The first section of the book focuses on the re-evaluation of ethics after the “death of 
God” and opens with an essay by Alphonso Lingis, “The Malice of Good Deeds,” in which the 
Levinassian philosophy of generosity confronts Nietzsche’s acerb critique of pity.  The Nietz-
schean critique of pity is interesting in that it sheds a different light on the suffering of the 
other as constitutive of his or her “destiny” (26) and as such, requires on the part of the self, 
not an attitude of compassion as Levinas would promote, but on the contrary, of non-
intervention.  The “malice” of compassion is disclosed here and finds itself profoundly proble-
matized by the Nietzschean critique. 
Jill Stauffer’s “The Imperfect,” compares the Nietzschean concept of eternal return with 
the Levinassian concept of recurrence, showing two different ways of responding to the inhe-
rent passivity of the human subject.  Stauffer judiciously compares Nietzsche’s description of 
human subjectivity as evicted from its comfort zone to Levinas’ description of a subjectivity 
“ill at ease” (41) with itself, thus shedding light on an intrinsic imperfection, fracture, and 
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incompletion of subjectivity.  Both thinkers courageously define a limit to what subjectivity 
can do, all the while sketching out a possible response to this passivity: a tragic self-affirma-
tion in the case of Nietzsche, and ethical awakening in Levinas.   
Jean Michel Longneaux’s “Nietzsche and Levinas: The Impossible Relation” constitutes 
a confrontation of Levinas’ description of the ethical encounter with Nietzsche’s critique of the 
morality of ressentiment.  Although Levinas’ departure of enjoyment for ethics seems to con-
tain traces of the morality of ressentiment, Longneaux shows that the alternative Nietzschean 
description of the self as tragic and incapable of transcending its condition contains within 
itself an inherent pessimism.  Longneaux concludes with a number of questions addressed to 
both philosophers, showing that a re-evaluation of ethics on both sides is necessary.   
Judith Butler's essay "Ethical Ambivalence" confronts Nietzsche's critique of Judaism as 
a religion of the law (and, as such, as a religion of ressentiment), to Levinas' reweaving of this 
law in his ethical philosophy. In Levinas, the law is no more a text situated outside the self but 
the solicitation of the human other that befalls the self with the “crushing force of the 
unappeasable law.” (72)  But this “crushing force” of the Levinassian “superegoic law” (72) 
must, in turn, be criticized in the light of the Nietzschean critique and give way to the 
interrogation of whether the impossibility of a “critical evaluation of the demand” (72) would 
not lead to new forms of fascism. 
Claire Elise Katz’s essay “Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Thus Listened the Rabbis” contrasts 
Zarathustra’s isolationist pedagogy to that of the Talmudic rabbis, which considers the dis-
ciple as an interlocutor and equal partner in the search for truth.  Katz shows that Zarathus-
tra’s isolation and his failure to communicate his philosophy lies in a lack of appreciation for 
what they could have brought him.  This is an interesting confrontation in that it presents the 
Nietzschean pedagogy with a new orientation out of its aporia—that of Talmudic sages.  But 
the dialogue between Nietzsche and Levinas remains monologic as Levinas seems to have 
nothing, in turn, to learn from Nietzsche.   
The second section of the book focuses on a re-evaluation of the human subject after the 
“death of God” and opens with an essay by Bettina Bergo, “The Flesh Made Word; Or the Two 
Origins.”  This essay compares Nietzsche’s understanding of the body with Levinas’ embo-
died understanding of ethics.  This comparison is judicious in that it sheds light on the Nietz-
schean influence on Levinas’ work on the body, all the while showing how Levinas opens up 
new dimensions of transcendence in the Nietzschean concept of recurrence as containing the 
possibility of a renewed sensitivity to otherness.   
Rosalyn Diprose’s essay “Nietzsche, Levinas and the Meaning of Responsibility” sees 
Nietzsche as a precursor for Levinas’ struggle against the juridico-moral model of respon-
sibility.  Diprose shows that although Nietzsche and Levinas situate responsibility outside of a 
code of conduct and as prone to a return to embodied subjectivity, Nietzsche’s sense of re-
sponsibility crystallizes into an “imperialistic self” (126) and remains locked within the 
confines of subjectivity.  The aporia reached by Nietzsche is however overcome by a re-
thinking by Levinas of the Nietzschean embodied self as inseparable from an awakening to 
otherness, and in so doing opens new horizons of responsibility unanticipated by Nietzsche.   
John Drabinski’s “Beginning’s Abyss: On Solitude in Nietzsche and Levinas” shows 
that the two philosophies emerge out of the same catastrophic event of the destruction of the 
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Western categories of thought in which subjectivity had hereto found a home.  This tragic 
event, or “abyss,” (134) explains according to Drabinski, a certain “melancholy” (135) in the 
thought of both philosophers.  Yet at the same time, this catastrophic event opens up a horizon 
of new philosophical possibilities that nevertheless remain in the light of that primordial 
trauma, laden with the “gravity of the task of beginning.” (147) 
David Boothroyd’s essay “Beyond Suffering I have no Alibi”, compares the Levinassian 
and Nietzschean understandings of suffering.  Although both philosophers see suffering as 
containing the possibility of transcendence, Nietzsche sees suffering as a way for subjectivity 
to elevate itself to the state of nobility—“No cruelty, no feast” (159)—whereas Levinas under-
stands suffering as that which elevates a hereto selfish self to the height of ethics—“No 
suffering, no ethics.” (159)  In both philosophies a possible signification is given to suffering: 
aesthetic for Nietzsche and ethical for Levinas.  These two significations do not confront each 
other in this essay, and one is left to wonder whether a dialogue between the cruel joy of the 
barbarian and the pain-ridden conscience of the Jew is possible. 
Richard A. Cohen’s essay “Levinas, Spinozism, Nietzsche and the Body” is interesting 
in that it shows essential articulations between the three thinkers in their rethinking of human 
subjectivity.  Although Nietzsche sees in Spinoza a precursor to his thoughts on the need to 
free subjectivity from traditional morality, he departs from Spinoza in his emphasis on the 
embodied character of this liberation.  Levinas follows in Nietzsche’s footsteps in this recovery 
of the embodied character of subjectivity, but unlike Nietzsche, and this time more in tune 
with Spinoza, he sees this embodied subjectivity as inseparable from the good, that is, from a 
concern with otherness.  This three-part dialogue is judicious in that it shows not only the 
indebtedness of each philosophy to the other, but also the new ways that each philosophy 
branches out of the other. 
The third section re-evaluates the concept of God and opens with an essay by John 
Llewelyn, “Suffering Redeemable and Irredeemable,” comparing Levinas’ thoughts on 
redemption with Nietzsche’s.  Llewelyn shows that although both thinkers are prone to a re-
demption apart from any reference to God, they differ in that the Levinassian redemption 
stems from an awakening to the other’s suffering, while the Nietzschean redemption arises 
from an assumption that the suffering is noble.  This juxtaposition leaves one wanting an 
evaluation of these two understandings of redemption in each other’s light, as well as 
wondering whether a redemption which fails to do away with the problem of suffering can be 
defined as such. 
Aicha Liviana Messina’s essay “Levinas’ Gaia Scienza” highlights an obvious contrast 
between Levinas’ and Nietzsche’s understanding of the “death of God.”  While Nietzsche sees 
this death as an opportunity for the self to affirm itself and like the “lion” (205) refute all 
servility towards an other, Levinas sees this death as that which precisely uncovers the self’s 
responsibility for an other.  Yet, Messina judiciously uncovers beneath this obvious contrast a 
profound similarity between the two thinkers.  Indeed, Nietzsche does not stop at the meta-
phor of the lion but transforms this image into that of a “child” (205) who, in its innocence, 
lives in a loving acceptance of all the possibilities that the future might bring in an open stance 
to an ungraspable otherness reminiscent of the Levinassian understanding of responsibility. 
Silvia Benso’s essay “Levinas: Another Ascetic Priest?” offers an excellent response to 
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the Nietzschean critique of Levinas’ thought as a morality of resentment.  Benso shows that, 
although the terminology of Levinas’ ethical language speaks to a contraction of the self in the 
face of the other, it cannot be understood as promoting an ascetic ideal.  Indeed, according to 
Benso, the Levinassian contraction of the self does not signify a denial of the self, but on the 
contrary, testifies to a plenitude of the self which, at the contact of the other, is transformed 
into a generous gift.  Interestingly, this idea of an excessive generosity stemming from a 
wealth of the self is already attested to in Nietzsche’s own understanding of the noble self, 
thus pointing to a possible point of reconciliation between Nietzsche’s and Levinas’ philoso-
phy of the self. 
Brian Schroeder’s “Apocalypse, Eschatology and the Death of God,” draws an inte-
resting parallel between Levinas and Nietzsche’s responses to the death of God.  The two res-
ponses originally seem to point in opposite directions: the Levinassian pointing to an escha-
tology which, in its ethical connotation, opens up a future of unknown possibilities; the 
Nietzschean pointing to an apocalyptic destruction of the idols of morality.  Beneath this con-
trast, however, Schroeder shows that the apocalyptic is not so far removed from the escha-
tological in that it opens upon a new orientation of the self defined as a “yes-saying” before an 
endless multiplicity of horizons.   
This compilation of essays has made room for a renewed inquiry into the aftermath of 
the “death of God.”  The often ingenious comparisons of Levinas’ and Nietzsche’s philoso-
phies have offered thought-provoking, although often divergent, treatments of this problem.  
In the estimation of the reader, the only drawback is the feeling that a more genuine dialogue 
between the two thinkers should have taken place.  Instead of a juxtaposition of the two philo-
sophies that is limited to comparing Nietzsche and Levinas, the reader would have benefited 
from a more genuine confrontation between the two, which might lead to a more fruitful 
dialogue.   
But perhaps this want on the part of the reader is good.  Indeed, new questions have 
been raised, and room has been made for two radically different thinkers to take their seats at 
the table.  The reader has, at best, been able to hear each philosopher’s views on a given 
subject and the essayists have succeeded in giving each a space to express himself.  The final 
judge must then be the reader; he or she must now deepen his or her own reflection and 
reading of Nietzsche and/or Levinas in light of what has been written, and pave a way beyond 
everything that has been said.    
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